



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300240002-6

**Top Secret**

25X1

# National Intelligence Daily

*Saturday*  
*28 April 1979*

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

**Top Secret**

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300240002-6

348

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300240002-6

Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300240002-6




Contents


Alert Memorandum

Cuba - Southern Africa: *Possible Movement of Cuban Forces into Frontline States*. . . . . 1



Briefs and Comments



Chad-Libya: *Military Situation*. . . . . 9



Overnight Reports. . . . . 18



25X1





ALERT MEMORANDUM

CUBA - SOUTHERN AFRICA: Possible Movement of Cuban Forces into Frontline States


25X1

*Fragmentary evidence suggests that a significant movement of Cuban forces into southern Africa may be about to occur with Soviet support. Since about 17 April, when the Frontline Defense Ministers (Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania) met in Dar es Salaam, there have been a number of reports and rumors that the Frontline States were about to call for "outside help" to assist them in defending their territories, and the Zimbabwe guerrilla bases there, against Rhodesian attacks. Rumors began to circulate in Lusaka about 24 April that Soviet aircraft with Cuban pilots were to arrive there soon.*



The arrival of Cuban military units, as distinct from some increment of advisory personnel or air defense specialists, for example, would be a new development in any of the Frontline States except Angola, and would mark a very sharp shift in policy by the leaders of Zambia and


--continued




25X1

25X1


25X1





25X1

Tanzania, in particular. DIA believes that Mozambique would be a more likely candidate than either of these states for a sizable movement of Cubans. 

25X1


Such a development would obviously sharpen the "cold war" aspects of the Rhodesian situation. It would also serve to justify, in their own eyes at least, the South Africans' conviction that whites and moderate blacks in southern Africa face a Communist offensive and could result in even more open and more direct South African support for the Muzorewa/Smith regime. 

25X1

Moreover, a new Cuban move at this time clearly would have, or be seen to have, implications for a wide range of relationships between the United States, the USSR, and Cuba, as well as between the United States and African states. It would also impact on British and other West European opinion and attitudes toward southern African problems and toward US policies there.   


25X1

25X1




25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300240002-6

Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300240002-6



## CHAD-LIBYA: Military Situation

The Chadian provisional government apparently exaggerated its recent allegation that Libya was conducting a major incursion into northwestern Chad from the Aozou Strip--a section of Chad occupied by Libya since 1973. French pilots flying government reinforcements to the north saw no signs of recent combat there. Fighting, however, is reported farther to the east where government forces have clashed with Libyan-supported Muslim rebels. The ruling Chadian provisional council almost certainly used the purported Libyan invasion to support its earlier efforts to postpone the scheduled withdrawal of some 2,500 French military personnel. The Chadians are anxious to maintain a strong French presence to discourage military activity by Libya and Libyan-backed insurgents. The council is also using the alleged incursion to rally popular support. Council members are still attempting to form an interim government that will exclude several smaller Muslim factions, including the two supported by Libya and involved in the current fighting.



25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300240002-6

Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300240002-6



25X1

#### OVERNIGHT REPORTS


(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

#### USSR-US


Writing yesterday in *Pravda*, a Soviet commentator said that the debate in the US concerning verification of a SALT II treaty is "far-fetched" and that "pretended concern over the possibilities" of verification is a maneuver by unnamed opponents of detente to undermine SALT and deceive the US public. The commentator, Yevgeniy Grigoriyev, said that the USSR's international prestige as an honest partner is "indisputable" and that problems related to SALT can only be solved on the principles of equal security.

25X1

25X1




--continued



25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300240002-6



Haiti

The military is on low-grade alert and there are signs of increased military precautions, the US Embassy reports. [redacted] attribute the alert to a belief by the government that a Miami-based exile group plans to drop leaflets over Port au Prince; rumors of an exile invasion are widespread as well. The Embassy notes that there are other possibly related factors, such as imminent changes in the military leadership, and has no indication that there is any credible threat to the government. [redacted]


25X1

25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**

Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300240002-6



**Top Secret**

Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300240002-6